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I. INTRODUCTION 
At the close of the first half of the twentieth century, it was 
clear that the waters of the states “were only marginally suitable for 
even low-quality uses such as irrigation, stock watering and 
industrial intake.”1  Early federal efforts to control water pollution 
presumed that “the only water pollution problems worthy of being 
addressed flowed from sanitary sewers[,] . . . from municipal waste 
treatment plants[,] . . . and from industries dumping large loads of 
 
 †  Sherry A. Enzler J.D., Ph.D. is a Research Fellow in the Department of 
Forest Resources and a Resident Fellow at the Institute on the Environment at the 
University of Minnesota. 
  1.  Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the 
Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control 
Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99 (2010).    
1
Enzler: EPA-Minnesota AG Certainty Program—Is it up to the Task of Cleani
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
960 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:3 
raw organic waste material into waterways.”2  But as early as 1967, at 
least one forward-thinking observer noted: 
I am convinced that both from a technical and from an 
economic point of view most point source pollution can 
and will be brought under control in this country in the 
next 5 to 10 years.  As this happens the problem of 
pollution from non-point or diffused sources will become 
our greatest challenge.  In no area will the challenge be 
greater than in agricultural pollution.  When we finally 
succeed in collecting and adequately treating our 
industrial and municipal wastes we will very likely find that 
many of our rivers are still dirty, unsafe, and 
unusable . . . .3 
That day is at hand.  Today “nonpoint” water pollution from 
agricultural pollution in particular poses one of the single largest 
remaining threats to our national water quality.4  Minnesota, like 
many other states, struggles to address the impacts of agricultural 
pollution on its water resource.5  In southern Minnesota, for 
example, the state has spent almost one billion dollars to clean the 
Minnesota River, much of it invested in voluntary agricultural 
incentive programs, but “the Minnesota River is, well, not much 
better than it was in 1990.”6  A Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
(MPCA) report, issued in May 2011, documented the failure of 
voluntary agricultural programs to abate water pollution on the 
 
 2.  N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How 
the 1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform 4 
(Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 12-12, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2045069. 
 3.  James M. Quigley, Water Quality and Agriculture in the United States: An 
Overall View, in AGRICULTURE AND THE QUALITY OF OUR ENVIRONMENT 134 (Nyle C. 
Brady ed., 1967). 
 4.  See generally Donn W. Furman, Poisoned Waters: An Examination of 
Agricultural Water Pollution, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 99 (1993); James M. 
McElfish, Jr. et al., Inventing Nonpoint Controls: Methods, Metrics and Results, 17 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 87 (2006); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and 
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000). 
 5.  See McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 128–64 (discussing Minnesota’s various 
programs to address pollution from agricultural and forestry sources). 
 6.  Josephine Marcotty, Minnesota River Still Ailing, STAR TRIB., May 10, 2011, 
http://www.startribune.com/local/121530289.html (referencing BENJAMIN 
LUNDEEN & MICHAEL KOSCHAK, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, REVISITING THE 
MINNESOTA RIVER ASSESSMENT PROJECT: AN EVALUATION OF FISH AND INVERTEBRATE 
COMMUNITY PROGRESS (2011) [hereinafter REVISITING THE MINNESOTA RIVER], 
available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid          
=15821). 
2
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Minnesota River, causing many to wonder “whether the state’s 
largely voluntary approach to protecting its waters is working” and 
whether we can continue to rely on “random acts of conservation” 
to address agricultural contamination of our water resources.7 
Our failure to regulate agricultural point sources outside of 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO)8 and nonpoint 
agricultural pollution has come at a tremendous cost to both our 
nation’s waters and the waters of the individual states.  Farmland 
consumes about one half of the landmass in the contiguous United 
States, and water pollution emanating from agricultural sources is 
the largest remaining contributor of water pollution in the United 
States,9 “affecting 70 percent of impaired rivers and streams and 
forty-nine percent of impaired lake acreage.”10  Fifty-three percent 
of Minnesota’s landscape, or 24.7 million acres, is dedicated to 
agricultural production.11 
The breadth of the agricultural footprint on our nation’s 
waters is so significant that one commentator pondered whether we 
have abdicated the management of our nation’s natural resources 
to farmers, including our water: “‘Farmers and ranchers control 
how most of our land is used and managed . . . .  They are literally, the 
most important soil, water, fish, wildlife, and recreational managers in the 
U.S.’  They have not, however, been particularly good stewards of 
our water resources . . . .”12 
On January 17, 2012, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Administrator Lisa Jackson, U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Secretary Tom Vilsack, and Minnesota Governor Mark 
Dayton signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for a 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Only CAFOs are treated as point sources requiring a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the CWA.  40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.23(a) (2008).  Not all animal feedlots are considered CAFOs requiring an 
NPDES permit, however.  Generally, to be classified as a CAFO, an animal feedlot 
must confine more than 1000 animal units.  Id. 
 9.  Ruhl, supra note 4, at 288.  
 10.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CLEAN WATER ACTION 
PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA’S WATERS 9 (1998). 
 11.  MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MINNESOTA’S NONPOINT SOURCE 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM PLAN 2008 § 8-259 (2008) [hereinafter MPCA]. 
 12.  Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: 
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 22 (2002) (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(quoting CRAIG A. COX, WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP IN 
FUTURE FARM POLICY? (2001), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle 
/33062). 
3
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voluntary agriculture certification program intended to address the 
challenges posed by agriculture to Minnesota’s water quality.13  The 
program, quickly dubbed the Ag Certainty Program, will release 
farmers from potential future water quality regulations for up to 
ten years if they voluntarily implement Best Management Practices 
(BMP) designed to reduce water pollution.14  The federal-state 
partners lauded the new program as a “bold” step to protect our 
rivers, lakes, and streams.15  But the program, which will be 
managed by the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MnDAg), 
quickly met with criticism.  Environmental interests viewed the 
proposal with a high degree of skepticism, characterizing it as yet 
another voluntary scheme to address agricultural water pollution 
and observing that Minnesota’s forty-year history with voluntary 
programs has resulted in insufficient reductions of agricultural 
pollution in our lakes, rivers, and streams—“[the Ag Certainty 
Program] enshrines the old ways, defying all rationality,” observed 
Whitney Clark of Friends of the Mississippi River.16  Agricultural 
interests, on the other hand, are hesitant to endorse the Ag 
Certainty Program, noting the “devil’s in the details.”17  Can the Ag 
Certainty Program produce significant improvements to our water 
quality, or is this yet another voluntary incentive program, which 
like so many before it is doomed to failure?  The outcome of this 
experiment will depend, in large part, on whether this new 
voluntary program embodies essential characteristics of successful 
voluntary programs. 
Part II of this article outlines the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
framework for cleaning the nation’s waters and its treatment of 
agricultural pollution.  Part III provides a brief analysis of our 
 
 13.  Stephanie Hemphill, New Program to Protect Water Quality; Details to Be 
Worked Out, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS, Jan. 17, 2012, http://minnesota.publicradio 
.org/display/web/2012/01/17/water-quality/.  
 14.  Id.; Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program, MINN. 
DEPARTMENT  AGRIC., http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection 
/awqcprogram/awqcprogramfaq.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).  
 15.  Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Administrator Jackson, Secretary 
Vilsack Sign Historic Agreement with State of Minnesota to Help Farmers Protect 
Rivers, Streams and Lakes (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov 
/opa/admpress.nsf/0/9E2AAEF7CBCC2D468525798800692A58. 
 16.  Josephine Marcotty, Minnesota Launches Mississippi River Cleanup Effort, 
STAR TRIB., Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/local/137454108.html 
?refer=y; Marcotty, supra note 6. 
 17.  Sara Wyant, Farmers, Environmental Groups Search for “Regulatory Certainty”, 
AGRIPULSE (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.agri-pulse.com/Farmers-environmental               
-groups-search-for-regulatory-certainty-01182012.asp. 
4
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attempts to address agricultural nonpoint pollution with voluntary 
programs and the essential elements necessary for successful 
voluntary programs.  Part IV of this article describes and analyzes 
the potential opportunities and pitfalls presented by the proposed 
Agricultural Certainty Program. 
II. HOW DID WE GET TO THIS POINT?  THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND 
AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION  
 The primary objective of the CWA is to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”18  To achieve this objective Congress set out a number of 
interim and long-term goals, the most immediate of which was the 
“swimmable fishable” goal—by 1983, water quality, wherever 
attainable, should be sufficient “for the protection and propagation 
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provide for recreation in and on 
the water.”19  The CWA also had the loftier goal of eliminating all 
pollution discharges by 1985.20  While early federal pollution 
control efforts focused on discharges from industrial and 
municipal point sources, Congress in 1987 amended the CWA to 
clarify the role of nonpoint sources in meeting these national goals, 
directing the adoption and implementation of programs to control 
nonpoint sources of pollution.21 
A. The Clean Water Act Framework 
1. Water Quality Standards and Effluent Limits 
The CWA was the culmination of a multi-generational attempt 
to address the quality of our nation’s waters.22  The framework of 
the CWA was greatly influenced by the 1948 Water Pollution 
Control Act,23 which was premised on the assumption that the states 
 
 18.  Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 101(a), 86 Stat. 816 
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)). 
 19.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). 
 20.  Id. § 1251(a)(1). 
 21.  Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 319, 10 Stat. 52 (codified 
at 33 U.S.C. § 1329). 
 22.  Hines, supra note 2, at 2.  Hines provides an excellent overview of 
national attempts to control water pollution dating back to the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899.  Id. at 6. 
 23.  Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).  
Hines notes that historically there was significant debate over the scope of the 
federal role in regulating water pollution.  Until the mid-twentieth century the 
5
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and local units of government were primarily responsible for 
regulating water pollution.24  But by the mid-1960s it became 
apparent that state and local control of water pollution was 
generating a race to the bottom as southern and western states 
used the promise of lax water regulations to lure northern 
industries to relocate.  This prompted Congress, in 1965, to design 
a national regulatory water quality floor in the guise of ambient 
water quality standards.25  Setting and implementing the new 
ambient water quality standards was largely left to the states and 
involved a three-step process.26  The states were first required to 
designate use classifications for each water body,27 including: 
“public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, 
recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other 
legitimate uses.”28  States were then directed to set ambient water 
quality standards to support the water body’s intended use.29  These 
water quality standards were submitted to the Department of the 
Interior for approval.30  After setting water quality standards, states 
were required to develop water quality implementation plans.31  
Hypothetically the federal government could enforce state water 
quality standards but rarely took steps to do so.32  By 1970 only half 
 
federal government limited its role in water management to federally defined 
navigable waters.  Hines, supra note 2, at 4–11.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1966 
ruling in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966), changed the playing 
field.  In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court reversed its prior decisions and held 
that the 1899 Refuse Act gave the Army Corps of Engineers broad authority to 
regulate pollution discharges into navigable waters regardless of whether the 
pollution discharge impeded navigation.  Id. at 228–30; see also Hines, supra note 2, 
at 23, 28–30 (discussing the influence of the Standard Oil case on the development 
of the CWA). 
 24.  Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 101–02. 
 25.  Id. at 102.  The term “ambient water quality standards” refers to the water 
quality standards for individual bodies of water, such as a river, lake, stream, or 
wetland.  See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, METHODOLOGY FOR DERIVING 
AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH (2000), 
available at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/upload/2005_05 
_06_criteria_humanhealth_method_complete.pdf (explaining the criteria for 
setting ambient water quality). 
 26.  Hines, supra note 2, at 20. 
 27.  Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903. 
 28.  Id. § 5(c)(3). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Hines, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
 31.  Id. at 20 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING 
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS (1966)). 
 32.  Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 102–04; see also Hines, supra note 2, 
at 21. 
6
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of the states had approved water quality standards and Congress 
concluded that present attempts to abate water pollution were 
wholly inadequate.33 
In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA to address the 
shortcomings of the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act.34  The CWA 
encompasses a dual system of water quality standards: ambient 
water quality standards and effluent limits.35  While the Water 
Pollution Control Act relied exclusively on ambient water quality 
standards, the CWA recognized that use of ambient water quality 
standards alone permitted pollution sources to take advantage of 
the assimilative capacity of water bodies to accommodate pollution 
discharges.36  That is, under the Water Pollution Control Act, once 
pollution was discharged by a source into a water body, the 
pollution mingled with pollution discharged from other sources, 
and it became difficult to tell what pollution came from what 
discharge source and which source was responsible for the ultimate 
exceedance of ambient water quality standards.  This made it 
difficult to bring an enforcement action against individual 
discharge sources because science was unable to identify a cause-
and-effect link between ambient water quality and any given 
pollutant discharge.37  By designing dual water-quality standards, 
Congress intended to overcome these and other shortcomings of 
the Water Pollution Control Act.38 
Structurally, the CWA carried forward the requirement that 
states set use-based ambient water quality standards for their 
intrastate waters subject to EPA approval.39  If a state failed to adopt 
ambient water quality standards or the EPA determined that the 
standards were inadequate, the EPA was authorized to promulgate 
water quality standards for the state.40  But the CWA did not rely 
solely on ambient water quality standards.  To resolve the scientific 
uncertainty challenge to implementation of ambient water quality 
 
 33.  Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 102–04. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  An effluent limit is a restriction on the “quantities, rates, and 
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are 
discharged from point sources” into navigable waters.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) 
(2006). 
 36.  Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 119.  
 37.  Id. at 120–21. 
 38.  Id. at 119. 
 39.  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
 40.  Id. § 1313(b). 
7
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standards, the CWA relied on effluent limits.41  Effluent limits were 
based, at least initially, on best available technology to control 
pollution at the point of discharge, thus eliminating the need to 
premise discharge standards on a causal link between the quality of 
the discharge and ambient water quality.42  Effluent limits were 
applied to water discharges from each individual point source or 
group of point sources.43  Ambient water quality standards under 
the CWA thus became the water quality floor.44  Effluent limits were 
met by applying best-available technology to individual point 
sources in anticipation that the cumulative application of effluent 
limits across point sources would bring us closer to meeting 
ambient water quality standards and eventually permit us to meet 
the no-discharge aspirations of the CWA.45 
2. The Point Source (NPDES) Program 
The CWA prohibits point sources from discharging any 
pollutant46 into navigable waters without first obtaining a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit,47 which 
requires permittees to meet technology-based effluent limits.48  
Effluent limits are set by industry category and are subject to 
adjustment if the receiving water body does not meet ambient 
water quality standards.49  In 1974, the EPA delegated NPDES 
permitting authority to the MPCA.50 
A point source is defined by the CWA as “any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any 
 
 41.  See Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 119–20 (discussing congressional 
reasoning for adoption of both ambient water quality limits and effluent limits). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1312. 
 44.  Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 124. 
 45.  Id. at 125 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 101–02 (1972)).  
 46.  Pollution is defined as “the man-made or man-induced alteration of the 
chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water.”  33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(19).  
 47.  Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a).   
 48.  Id. §§ 1318, 1342. 
 49.  See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (containing a detailed discussion of the operation of the CWA and how 
effluent limits are set). 
 50.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (permitting the EPA to delegate management of 
the NPDES program to the states); MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, MUNICIPAL 
SEPARATE STORM SEWER SYSTEM (MS4) GENERAL PERMIT REISSUANCE PROCESS AND 
REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view    
-document.html?gid=17090. 
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pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or 
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.”51  The definition of pollution includes “agricultural 
waste discharge[].”52  A plain reading of these definitions suggests 
that agricultural drainage systems would seemingly meet the literal 
definition of a point source.  However, the EPA was reluctant to 
include agricultural operations in the NPDES program from day 
one, instead adopting regulations exempting agricultural point 
sources from the NPDES program.53  The Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the EPA exemption, arguing 
that the EPA had no legal authority to exempt a whole class of 
point sources from the NPDES program.54  The EPA rationalized 
the exemption not on the basis that agricultural operations were 
not point sources, but rather that it was difficult to set effluent 
limits for agricultural operations55 and that the sheer number of 
agricultural operations made regulation difficult.56  The D.C. 
Circuit Court rejected the feasibility argument, noting that the 
NPDES program allowed the EPA to issue NPDES permits without 
setting effluent limits.57  The EPA could issue NPDES permits while 
developing the technology necessary to set technological effluent 
limits for agricultural point sources.58  The court also rejected the 
EPA’s numbers argument because the EPA had the legal authority 
to issue general NPDES permits for classes of discharge sources, but 
the EPA had no legal authority to exempt an entire class of point 
 
 51.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added). 
 52.  Id. § 1362(6); see also Alfred R. Light, The Myth of Everglades Settlement, 11 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 55, 57 (1998).  See generally David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint 
Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 
20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1996) (discussing attempts to address nonpoint 
pollution using the CWA). 
 53.  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 
1977).  The EPA regulation exempted certain farming operations, including 
CAFOs and “all irrigation return flows from areas of less than 3000 contiguous 
acres or 3000 noncontiguous acres that use the same drainage system; all 
nonfeedlot, nonirrigation agricultural point sources; and separate storm sewers 
containing only storm runoff uncontaminated by any industrial or commercial 
activity,” from the NPDES program.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 1373. 
 55.  Id. at 1377–78. 
 56.  Id. at 1380. 
 57.  Id. at 1378–79. 
 58.  Id. 
9
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discharge sources from the NPDES program.59  The court ordered 
the EPA to apply the NPDES program to agricultural point 
sources.60 
Shortly after the EPA promulgated regulations for agricultural 
point sources, Congress amended the CWA to exempt both 
agricultural stormwater runoff and “return flows from irrigated 
agriculture” (irrigation return flow exemption) from the NPDES 
program.61  Neither Congress nor the EPA have defined the terms 
agriculture stormwater runoff or irrigation return flow, nor have 
they addressed the scope of these exemptions.  It is unclear, for 
example, whether the agricultural storm water and irrigation 
return flow exemptions apply to ditch systems, which collect 
discharges from agricultural operations where such ditch systems 
are built, maintained, and managed not by individual farmers, but 
by county boards sitting as drainage ditch authorities.62  At least one 
court has found the agricultural stormwater runoff and irrigation 
return flow exemptions apply only to those entities actually engaged 
in agriculture.63  Likewise, while it is clear that the CWA exemptions 
include diffuse runoff from agricultural lands,64 it is unclear 
whether the exemptions extend to drainage ditch systems that carry 
waters from both agricultural and non-agricultural sources.  Thus, 
Hanson and Bender argue, the point source definitions would 
seemingly apply to agriculture runoff collected and conveyed 
through ditch systems,65 such as the 20,000 miles of man-made 
ditches in Minnesota that carry nutrient- and sediment-laden farm 
field runoff directly into Minnesota’s rivers, lakes, and streams.66  
 
 59.  Id. at 1381–82. 
 60.  Id. at 1383. 
 61.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(14), 1342(l) (2006).  See generally Andrew C. Hanson & 
David C. Bender, Irrigation Return Flow or Discrete Discharge?  Why Water Pollution from 
Cranberry Bogs Should Fall Within the Clean Water Act’s NPDES Program, 37 ENVTL. L. 
339 (2007) (containing a detailed discussion of the irrigation return flow 
exemption for agriculture). 
 62.  See generally MINN. STAT. § 103E.011 (2010) (outlining the powers of 
drainage ditch authorities).  A drainage ditch authority is the board of county 
commissioners or joint county drainage authority with jurisdiction over a drainage 
ditch system in its county or counties.  Id. § 103E.005, subdiv. 4, 9. 
 63.  Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. 246 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456–57 
(E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 64.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 65.  See Hanson & Bender, supra note 61, at 349.  
 66.  Mark Steil, New Study Targets Farm Ditches, MINN. PUB.                                         
RADIO NEWS (Mar. 2, 2006), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006 
/03/01/ditchstudy/; see also Hanson & Bender, supra note 61, at 348–50 
10
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Nonetheless, because of the stormwater and irrigation return flow 
exemptions, agricultural point sources have largely been lumped in 
with, and are treated as, non-regulated nonpoint sources. 
3. Controlling Nonpoint Pollution 
Even in 1972 Congress understood that addressing the 
nation’s water-quality challenges required “vigorously” addressing 
nonpoint pollution,67 noting that “[s]ediment, often associated with 
agricultural activities, is by volume our major pollutant, not only 
from the degrading effect of the sediment, but because it also 
transports other pollutants.”68  But control of nonpoint pollutants, 
including agricultural pollution, is largely left to the individual 
states.69  Nor is the term “nonpoint pollution” defined in the CWA, 
although the term is understood to mean “pollution that arises 
from many dispersed activities over large areas . . . not traceable to 
any single discrete source.”70 
Congress’s decision to exclude nonpoint pollution, and 
agricultural water pollution in particular, from the CWA regulatory 
scheme was based on a number of factors.  First, from a technical 
perspective, the means of controlling and measuring nonpoint 
pollution was difficult.71  Unlike point sources, pollution from 
nonpoint sources is diffuse and arguably difficult to monitor, 
making the enforcement of effluent limits, which require 
monitoring at the point of discharge, with then-existing 
technology, difficult,72 although not impossible.73  Even if it were 
possible to set effluent limits, these sources are unlike point sources 
 
(discussing ditches as conduits for fertilizer-laden runoff). 
 67.  H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 109 (1972). 
 68.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1470–71 (Comm. 
Print 1973). 
 69.  JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 153 (2d ed. 2007). 
 70.  League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th 
Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 
1979). 
 71.  Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 1, at 115. 
 72.  Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 
615–16 (2008) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3668, 3706 (alleging that “many nonpoint sources of pollution are beyond present 
technology of control.”)). 
 73.  Cannon notes that since 1972, there have been a number of projects that 
have demonstrated the ability to reduce nonpoint pollution.  Id. 
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that could be controlled through technology-driven abatement 
mechanisms.  Controlling diffuse pollution requires land-use 
controls, and “[w]hat was the EPA supposed to do, tell farmers how 
to farm?”74  The inability to control pollution from diffuse sources 
does not explain, however, the exemption from regulation of 
agricultural drainage conveyance systems, which technically meet 
the definition of a point source and are, nonetheless, exempted 
from regulation as point sources.75  And even if we presume that 
diffuse sources of pollution are technically difficult to monitor and 
abate, technical difficulty has not stopped Congress or the EPA 
from addressing equally challenging environmental dilemmas; 
indeed, “[e]very environmental program of the past thirty years       
has had to grapple with scientific uncertainty . . . [and] 
inconsistencies.”76 
Second, it is possible Congress believed that it would have to 
regulate land use to control nonpoint pollution, and it was 
reluctant to do so.77  This observation is supported by the “scant” 
CWA legislative history, which suggests that the “states feared the 
prospect of ‘federal land use’ [control] and fought to retain [local] 
control over land use by maintaining control over supervision of 
nonpoint source pollution.”78 
Third, there is a national tendency to romanticize farming, 
which undermines the ability to regulate agriculture.  The 
tendency harkens back to the revolutionary era and Jefferson’s 
concept of agrarian democracy.79  De Tocqueville, in his discourse 
on democracy in America, argues that one of the foundations of 
American democracy is the abundant landmass available to millions 
of Americans for cultivation.80  Democracy in America is grounded in 
 
 74.  William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a 
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 562 (2004). 
 75.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 76.  Linda A. Malone, Myths and Truths That Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 76 (2002) [hereinafter Malone, Myths and Truths]; see also 
OLIVER HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 87 (1999) 
 77.  Cannon, supra note 72, at 616; Malone, Myths and Truths, supra note 76, 
at 77–78. 
 78.  Malone, Myths and Truths, supra note 76, at 78–79. 
 79.  See generally Linda A. Malone, Reflections on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an 
Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Environmental Ethic in the 
1990 Farm Bill, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1993) [hereinafter Malone, Jeffersonian 
Ideal]. 
 80.  ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 277–86 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., First Perennial Classics 2000) (1835). 
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the Jeffersonian ideal of an agrarian democracy, which in turn is 
predicated on the independent farmer.81  This ideal was amplified 
and shaped in Minnesota, as in many states in the upper Midwest, 
by the stories of our immigrant ancestors who, with the aid of the 
Homestead Act, forged new lives, often in hostile conditions on 
Minnesota’s prairies.82 
But the landscape of farming in America has changed.  While 
there are still a substantial number of family farms,83 at the close of 
the twentieth century only 124,000 people, or less than one percent 
of our population, own over half of America’s farmland,84 causing 
one commentator to observe that the Jeffersonian ideal of the 
independent farmer is dead.85  Nonetheless, we continue to 
premise public policy decisions, including water policy, on the 
family farm: 
Modern economic realities . . . have undermined the 
independence of the farmer and farms have ceased to be 
self-sustaining . . . . 
       The virtual extinction of the Jeffersonian farmer, 
however, did not extinguish the Jeffersonian ideal.  
Congress’ reluctance to dictate environmental norms for 
agriculture is rooted in a reverence for an independence 
which no longer exists. . . .  [T]he Jeffersonian ideal of an 
agrarian democracy impeded environmental reform, and 
wrongly so.86 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, is the power of the 
agricultural lobbying interest.  Not only do family farms constitute 
a significant voting bloc, but both the agrichemical and food 
processing industries are closely linked to the farming industry and 
politically align themselves with farming interests.87  Additionally, 
over the past decades the American Farm Bureau Federation, 
which “purports to speak for all farms[,] . . . has become one of the 
 
 81.  Malone, Jeffersonian Ideal, supra note 79, at 3. 
 82.  See, e.g., O.E. ROLVAAG, GIANTS IN THE EARTH (1927).  Rolvaag is the father 
of Karl Rolvaag, the thirty-first governor of the State of Minnesota.  Governors of 
Minnesota: Karl F. Rolvaag, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.mnhs.org 
/people/governors/gov/gov_33.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
 83.  In 2010, ninety-six percent of all farms were family-owned.  Family & 
Small Farms, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.nifa.usda.gov/nea/ag_systems/in 
_focus/familyfarm_if_overview.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).   
 84.  Malone (1993), supra note 79, at 3. 
 85.  Id. at 46. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Ruhl, supra note 4, at 331–32. 
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most powerful lobbying forces in the nation,” consistently and 
successfully fighting all attempts to impose any form of 
environmental regulation on farms.88  In 1987, for example, when 
Congress attempted to amend the CWA by connecting receipt of 
farm subsidies to the adoption of BMPs and conservation practices, 
the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Cattlemen’s 
Beef Association, and the Texas State Soil and Water Conservation 
Board quickly leveraged their political resources, causing Senator 
Bentsen (D-Tex) to threaten to kill the amendment unless the 
linkage between farm subsidies and conservation practices was 
dropped.89  Needless to say, the linkage between farm subsidies and 
conservation practices did not make it into the final amendments.90 
Despite its reluctance to regulate nonpoint pollution, 
Congress has attempted to grapple with the issue, relying on 
planning and financial aid programs.  Congress has, however, left 
the heavy lifting to the states.  Since 1987, Congress and the EPA 
have attempted to address nonpoint source pollution through 
CWA section 319 nonpoint source management programs.  The 
1987 CWA amendments essentially split the nonpoint world in half, 
bringing urban and industrial nonpoint stormwater pollution 
under the regulatory tent, but leaving agricultural nonpoint 
pollution outside.91  Agricultural pollution was to be managed 
through the non-regulatory section 319 program92—in the words of 
Professor Houck, “In 1987 Congress looked agricultural pollution 
in the eye and fainted.”93 
Section 319 requires the state to prepare and submit for EPA 
approval a report identifying “navigable waters . . . which, without 
additional action to control nonpoint sources of pollution, cannot 
 
 88.  Id. at 332; see also Christopher B. Connard, Sustaining Agriculture: An 
Examination of Current Legislation Promoting Sustainable Agriculture as an Alternative to 
Conventional Farming Practices, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 133–35 (2004) 
(discussing the political power of the farming industry and the American Farm 
Bureau Federation in particular). 
 89.  Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America’s Coastal Zone, 
47 MD. L. REV. 358, 378 (1988). 
 90.  Id.  Section 208 of the CWA represents Congress’s first attempt to address 
nonpoint agricultural pollution, using financial assistance to incentivize farmers to 
adopt BMPs.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1281(a), (c), 1288(b)(2)(F), (j) (2006).  Congress 
ceased funding the section 208 program in 1981.  Williams, supra note 12, at 69–
70.  
 91.  Houck, supra note 89, at 376; Williams, supra note 12, at 72. 
 92.  Houck, supra note 89, at 376. 
 93.  Id. at 377. 
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reasonably be expected to attain or maintain applicable water 
quality standards”;94 and identifying the significant nonpoint water 
pollution sources for said waters.95  Section 319 management plans 
must also describe how the state will control nonpoint sources, 
including reliance on BMPs and other “measures.”96  Section 319, 
which relies upon a federal grant program to encourage state 
compliance97 has, however, been notoriously underfunded.98  
Without the assurance of federal funding to underwrite agricultural 
nonpoint programs, most states “are unwilling, or unable” to 
aggressively attack sources of agricultural nonpoint pollution.99 
Minnesota’s most recent 319 report confirms that agriculture 
is a primary source of sediment and nutrient pollution in impaired 
lakes, rivers, and streams and has identified a number of BMPs to 
address agricultural sources of sedimentation and nutrient loading 
in Minnesota’s waters.100  However, section 319 authorizes but does 
not require the states to adopt enforcement measures to ensure 
BMPs are actually adopted; nor does it require states to penalize 
nonpoint source polluters that fail to adopt BMPs.101  Minnesota 
has chosen not to undertake a regulatory regime to assure 
adoption of BMPs and other conservation practices by the 
agricultural sector, relying instead on financial incentives.102 
Agricultural limitations notwithstanding, section 303(d) of the 
CWA could hypothetically provide an alternative avenue to tackle 
agricultural water pollution.103  Many policy analysts view section 
303(d) as a “second-string safeguard” and the only real means to 
address nonpoint agricultural pollution under the CWA.104  Section 
303(d) uses the state’s water quality standards as the basis to set 
pollution loads or “total maximum daily loads” (TMDL) for priority 
 
 94.  33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A). 
 95.  Id. § 1329(a)(1)(B). 
 96.  Id. § 1329(a)(1)(C). 
 97.  Id. § 1329(h). 
 98.  Williams, supra note 12, at 75. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See generally MPCA, supra note 11, at ch. 8–9. 
 101.  33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(B); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? 
The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 179, 190 (2000). 
 102.  See generally MPCA, supra note 11, at ch. 8–9. 
 103.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
 104.  Jim Vergura & Ron Jones, The TMDL Program: Land Use and Other 
Implications, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 317, 320 (2001). 
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impaired water bodies.105  Once the state establishes its water 
standards, section 303(d) requires the state to: (1) identify water 
bodies that fail to meet ambient water quality standards despite 
effluent limit point source controls; (2) rank impaired water 
bodies; and (3) for each impaired water body, establish TMDLs at a 
level designed to achieve ambient water standards106 (loading 
capacity).107  Section 303(d) makes no distinction between point 
sources and nonpoint sources.108  If a state fails to adopt TMDLs, 
the EPA is authorized to promulgate TMDLs for the state.109 
Establishing a TMDL is only the first step in the TMDL 
process.  Once a TMDL is set, states are required to impose 
additional controls or water quality-based effluent limits on point 
sources through waste load allocations (WLA)110 incorporated in 
point sources’ NPDES permits.111  Nonpoint sources are assigned 
load allocations (LA).  An LA is the part of the total pollution load 
in a TMDL that is allocated to a nonpoint source.112  The TMDL is 
the sum of pollutants equal to point source WLAs plus nonpoint 
source LAs, background source allocations, and a safety margin113 
that a water body can receive and still meet ambient water quality 
standards.114  Theoretically the TMDL specifies the volume of a 
pollutant, such as phosphorus, that a water body can receive and 
still meet state water quality standards.  After setting the TMDL the 
state prepares a water quality management plan115 documenting 
how it will implement the TMDL,116 including controlling sources 
of nonpoint pollution.117  The EPA has determined that it lacks the 
authority to implement TMDL nonpoint load reductions and must,  
 
 
 105.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
 106.  Id. § 1313(d)(1) . 
 107.  40 C.F.R. § 130.2(f) (2012). 
 108.  Pronsolino v. Nastari, 291 F.3d 1123, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003).  In Pronsolino 
the Ninth Circuit, pointing to the House Committee Report, acknowledged that 
Congress, in enacting section 303(d), recognized that the use of effluent limits to 
control point sources would not result in attainment of ambient water quality 
standards.  Id. at 1134. 
 109.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). 
 110.  40 C.F.R. § 130.2(h). 
 111.  Id. § 130.7(a). 
 112.  Id. § 130.2(g). 
 113.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(c). 
 114.  40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i). 
 115.  See id. § 130.6(a). 
 116.  33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(F). 
 117.  40 C.F.R. § 130.8(b)(4). 
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therefore, rely on the state to actually control nonpoint 
pollution.118 
Because TMDLs are predicated on ambient water quality 
standards, using TMDLs to regulate nonpoint agricultural 
pollution places the states squarely in the conundrum they had 
with point sources prior to the adoption of effluent limits—the 
states are trying to back into control of nonpoint pollution from 
water quality standards.  Meanwhile, many in the farming 
community continue to sing that old refrain—that there is no 
causal link between declining water quality standards and my 
farming practices.119 
III. “SOMETHING’S GOTTA GIVE” 
A. The Problem with Using Voluntary Incentive Programs to Achieve 
Water Quality Performance Improvements 
Minnesota, like many other states, has struggled to redress 
agricultural pollution outside of the NPDES program, relying 
primarily on voluntary incentive and subsidy programs.120  A 
voluntary environmental program is an effort to improve 
environmental quality that does not force participation.121  
Voluntary environmental programs depend on the good will of 
those willing, but not required, to participate. 
 
 
 118.  But see Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. 
Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79 (2003).  Blumm and Warnock argue that in large part 
our failure to address our water pollution challenges is due to the EPA’s lack of 
interest in pursuing a broad interpretation of the CWA, an interpretation “that 
would construe some of the statute’s ambiguities to fit the scope of the nation’s 
water pollution problem.”  Id. at 80.  Blumm and Warnock are particularly 
damning of the EPA’s failure to grapple with nonpoint pollution, arguing, “It 
simply has been more convenient for the EPA to treat nonpoint source pollution 
as only the states’ problem, and then to interpret broadly the pollution sources it 
defines as nonpoint, than to confront the difficulties of overseeing nonpoint 
source control.”  Id. at 110. 
 119.  See Press Release, Minn. Soybean Research & Promotion Council, 
Research Points to “Natural Causes” as Source of Most Sediment in Minnesota 
River (Oct. 10, 2010), available at http://www.mnsoybean.org/images/uploads 
/Satish_Gupta_Sediment_Study_final_1.pdf. 
 120.  See generally MPCA, supra note 11, §§ 8-259 to 9-323 (discussing strategies 
to address nonpoint agricultural pollution). 
 121.  Brian M. Dowd, Daniel Press & Marc Los Huertos, Agricultural Nonpoint 
Source Water Pollution Policy: The Case of California’s Central Coast, 128 AGRIC. 
ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 151, 152 (2008). 
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There are a number of federal grant programs that are used by 
states, including Minnesota, to encourage farmers to voluntarily 
participate in strategies to address nonpoint pollution.  EPA 
financial incentive programs account for approximately ten 
percent of federal funding available to address nonpoint 
agricultural pollution.122  As previously noted, the CWA section 319 
program provides grant funding for local watershed-based 
programs,123 including agricultural BMPs and conservation 
practices.124  However, by far the greatest inducement for farmers to 
adopt BMPs and conservation practices is provided by the Farm 
Bill, which “provide[s] 86 percent of the total federal funding 
potentially available for water quality, conservation, and watershed 
restoration projects,”125 including: the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP), which provides funding to retire environmentally 
sensitive farmlands for ten to fifteen years;126 the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), which provides technical, 
financial, and educational assistance to farmers to facilitate BMP 
adoption;127 the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program 
(CREP), which funds long-term conservation easements and 
encourages farmers to adopt conservation practices;128 and the 
Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP), which funds 
improvements to fish and wildlife habitat on agricultural lands.129 
Minnesota actively participates in a number of these voluntary 
federal programs.  The MPCA administers two assistance programs 
under the umbrella of the section 319 program to encourage 
watershed management of nonpoint pollution: (1) the Minnesota 
Clean Water Partnership (CWP) grant program and loan program 
and (2) the federal section 319 grant program.130  Between 1997 
and 2007, Minnesota invested over $91 million in section 319 and 
 
 122.  Craig Cox, U.S. Agricultural Conservation Policy and Programs: History, 
Trends and Implications, in U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 2007 FARM BILL 124 
fig.2 (Kaush Arha et al. eds., 2006); Cannon, supra note 72, at 627–28. 
 123.  McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 96–99. 
 124.  Cannon, supra note 72, at 627. 
 125.  Cox, supra note 122, at 124. 
 126.  Williams, supra note 12, at 104. 
 127.  Id. at 109–10. 
 128.  McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 92. 
 129.  Id. at 94. 
 130.  MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN WATER 
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index 
.php/view-document.html?gid=10220; MPCA, supra note 11, at ES-II.  
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Minnesota CWP projects to address nonpoint pollution131 and 
implemented 2783 BMPs.132 Although Minnesota keeps a record of 
the number and cost of these projects, it does not actually measure 
the reduction of pollution attributable to these BMPs, relying 
instead on self-reported estimates provided by the eLINK modeling 
system.133 
Minnesota also participates in a number of Farm Bill 
conservation incentive programs, ranking third in the nation in 
federal Farm Bill conservation funding.134  It has used federal Farm 
Bill funding to place an estimated 80,000 acres under CREP 
easements in the Minnesota River Basin and another 1.8 million 
acres in the CRP across the state.135  It is, however, unclear whether 
Minnesota can sustain these numbers as the acreage offered by 
agricultural operators for enrollment in CREP and CRP has 
declined, primarily because of increased land prices.136  Minnesota 
also participates in EQIP, the Wetlands Reserve Program, the 
Conservation Security Program, and WHIP.137 
At the state level, Minnesota citizens have made significant 
financial commitments to clean water.  In 2006, Minnesota passed 
the Clean Water Legacy Act, dedicating financial resources to 
“protect, restore, and preserve the quality of Minnesota’s surface 
waters.”138  The Act recognizes that nonpoint pollution sources have 
a responsibility to participate and support Minnesota’s efforts to 
achieve its water quality goals,139 and supports clean water by 
funding assistance and incentives.140  Minnesotans extended their 
commitment to clean water in 2008, passing the Clean Water, Land  
 
 
 
 131.  MPCA, supra note 11, at ES-II. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING 
IMPLEMENTATION PROJECTS IN ELINK4WEB: EPA 319 & CLEAN WATER PARTNERSHIP 
GRANTS (2009), available at http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/view                        
-document.html?gid=6256; McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 134; Conservation 
Implementation: Tools for Calculating Pollution Reduction Estimates, MINN. BOARD 
WATER & SOIL RESOURCES, http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/practices/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 134.  MPCA, supra note 11, at 2-59 to -60. 
 135.  Id. at 2-61. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 2-61 to -64. 
 138.  Clean Water Legacy Act, MINN. STAT. § 114D.10, subdiv. 1 (2010). 
 139.  Id. § 114D.10, subdiv. 2. 
 140.  Id. § 114D.10, subdiv. 1–2. 
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and Legacy Amendment (Legacy Amendment), a constitutional 
amendment dedicating funding 
to protect our drinking water sources; to protect, 
enhance, and restore our wetlands, forests, and fish, game 
and wildlife[;] . . . and to protect, enhance, and restore 
our lakes, rivers, streams, and groundwater by increasing 
the sales and use tax rate . . . by three-eighths of one 
percent on taxable sales.141 
Thirty-three percent of the revenue raised by the sales tax 
increase must “be deposited in the clean water fund and may be 
spent only to protect, enhance, and restore water quality in lakes, 
rivers, and streams and to protect groundwater from 
degradation.”142  Money generated by the Legacy Amendment 
“must supplement traditional sources of funding [clean water] . . . 
and may not be used as a substitute” to regular environmental 
appropriations.143  Money generated by the Legacy Amendment is 
deposited in the Clean Water Fund.144 
One of the Clean Water Fund’s primary investments is in 
voluntary BMP programs intended to redress agricultural pollution 
sources.  The Clean Water Council has adopted two performance 
measures for Clean Water Fund expenditures related to 
agricultural and other nonpoint pollution: (1) the percentage of 
Clean Water Fund dollars spent on protection, restoration, and 
implementation projects;145 and (2) the number of BMPs 
 
 141.  FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, MINN. H.R., ISSUE BRIEF: 2008 CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT AUTHORIZED—SALES TAX INCREASE PROPOSED FOR NATURAL RESOURCE 
AND CULTURAL HERITAGE PURPOSES 1 (2008), available at http://www.house.leg 
.state.mn.us/fiscal/files/ib2008Salestaxamend.pdf. 
 142.  MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 15.  Five percent of the Clean Water Fund is 
dedicated to drinking water protection.  FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, supra note 141, 
at 3. 
 143.  FISCAL ANALYSIS DEP’T, supra note 141, at 4.  Shortly after the Legacy 
Amendment was passed, the legislature established the Clean Water Fund to 
receive a portion of the sales tax revenues.  Money deposited in the Clean Water 
Fund may be spent to “prevent surface waters from becoming impaired and                 
to improve the quality of waters listed as impaired.”  MINN. STAT. § 114D.20, 
subdiv. 3(7). 
 144.  MINN. STAT. § 114D.50. 
 145.  MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY ET AL., CLEAN WATER FUND 
PERFORMANCE REPORT 7 (2012), available at http://www.legacy.leg.mn/sites 
/default/files/resources/2012%20Clean%20Water%20Fund%20Performance 
%20Report_low%20resolution%20for%20web.pdf.  In fiscal year 2010–2011, the 
legislature appropriated $93.5 million for protection, restoration, and 
improvement activities (63% of the Clean Water Fund Appropriation).  Id.  The 
appropriation is expected to rise to $104 million in fiscal year 2012–2013.  Id. 
20
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installed.146  There are, however, no water quality performance 
measures for nonpoint incentive expenditures.147 
Despite the significant federal and state financial investments 
to address agricultural pollution through the CWA, the Farm Bill, 
and the Legacy Amendment, these voluntary programs are by and 
large considered unsatisfactory.148  Although billions of dollars have 
been expended on these programs, skeptics note that they have 
resulted in marginal success and question whether it is realistic to 
expect taxpayers to continue to fund voluntary environmental 
programs to address agricultural sources of water pollution.149  
Others argue that continuing to invest in voluntary incentive-based 
programs may simply perpetuate “the notion that farmers must be 
‘bribed’ to engage in sound, conservation-minded practices [and] 
has had the subtle effect of promoting the idea that farmers have a 
‘right’ to engage in environmentally destructive practices and must 
be paid to change those practices.”150 
Minnesota’s experience on the Minnesota River is illustrative 
of the shortcomings of these voluntary agricultural programs.  As 
early as 1989, it was clear that sediment, phosphorus, and nitrogen 
loading were significant problems in the Minnesota River.151  In 
1992 Governor Arne Carlson announced a ten-year initiative to 
“make the Minnesota River swimmable and fishable.”152  Shortly 
thereafter the Minnesota River Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) 
 
 146.  Id. at 15–16. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Cannon, supra note 72, at 628.  USDA programs include: the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), under which farmers are paid to commit to 
enroll and convert highly erodible and environmentally sensitive lands to 
vegetation cover, native grasses, trees, and riparian buffers for rental payments; the 
Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), which leverages CRP 
money to enhance the CRP; the Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP), which provides technical, financial, and educational assistance to 
landowners engaged in livestock and agricultural production; and the Wildlife 
Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP), which provides up to a seventy-five percent 
cost-share for landowners to improve fish and wildlife habitat.  See McElfish et al., 
supra note 4, at 91–96 (describing USDA environmental incentive programs). 
 149.  Williams, supra note 12, at 27–28. 
 150.  Id. at 28. 
 151.  KRIS SIGFORD, MINN. CTR. FOR ENVTL. ADVOCACY, MINNESOTA RIVER CLEAN-
UP: TEN YEARS LATER 2–3 (2002), available at http://www.mncenter.org/LinkClick 
.aspx?fileticket=Wu-DGUKraCg%3D&tabid =322; MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL 
AGENCY, MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN PLAN 5–6 (2001), available at http://www.pca.state 
.mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=9946 [hereinafter MINNESOTA RIVER 
BASIN PLAN]. 
 152.  MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN PLAN, supra note 151, at 6. 
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recommended that drainage ditches across the Minnesota River 
basin be treated as tributaries and that the state “mandate practices 
to control runoff if voluntary compliance does not work.”153  Over 
the next decade Minnesota spent almost $1.2 billion on efforts to 
curb nonpoint pollution in the Minnesota River. 154  Seventy 
percent of this expenditure was made in payments to farmers to 
implement conservation measures or retire farmland,155 and 
another $600 million was spent through CRP and CREP to 
purchase agricultural conservation easements.156  Despite these 
efforts, only 100,000 acres of the seven million acres of cultivated 
cropland in the Minnesota River basin were held in reserve, and 
the tributaries of the Minnesota River basin still showed high levels 
of nutrients and suspended solids,157 causing the Minnesota Center 
for Environmental Advocacy to recommend that Minnesota adopt 
agricultural performance standards, target agricultural 
conservation subsidies, and improve agricultural drainage ditch 
systems.158 
In 2008, twenty years after Governor Carlson’s 
pronouncement, the Minnesota River was listed by American Rivers 
as one of the ten most endangered rivers in the United States.159  As 
of 2009, sediment loads in the Minnesota River at St. Peter were 
300% above sediment loads at Judson, making the Minnesota River 
a major contributing factor in increased sedimentation rates in 
Lake Pepin.160  And while phosphorus levels have shown a modest 
decrease across the basin, most declines are attributed to a 
decrease in discharge rates from wastewater treatment facilities 
managed under the NPDES program.161  Further reductions are 
needed to reduce high-level algae growth and to meet water quality 
 
 153.  SIGFORD, supra note 151, at 2–3. 
 154.  Id. at 10. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 7. 
 157.  Id. at 15–17. 
 158.  Id. at 18–21. 
 159.  MINN. STATE UNIV., MANKATO WATER RES. CTR. ET AL., STATE OF THE 
MINNESOTA RIVER: SUMMARY OF SURFACE WATER QUALITY MONITORING 2000–2008, at 
3 (2009), available at http://mrbdc.mnsu.edu/sites/mrbdc.mnsu.edu/files/public 
/reports/basin/state_08/2008_fullreport1109.pdf [hereinafter STATE OF THE 
MINNESOTA RIVER 2008]. 
 160.  Id. at 14. 
 161.  Minn. Pollution Control Agency, Dashboard: Environmental and Performance 
Measures (2012) (on file with author). 
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standards for the Minnesota River.162  The conclusion: after twenty 
years of cleanup efforts and nearly a billion dollars in public 
expenditures on voluntary incentive programs intended to address 
agricultural pollution, “the Minnesota River is . . . not much better 
than it was in 1990.”163  Certainly, the experience of the Minnesota 
River raises the question—can we continue to rely on the same old 
voluntary, incentive-based programs to address agricultural 
nonpoint pollution? 
B. Four Elements Necessary for Successful Voluntary Programs 
The general failure of voluntary incentive programs to 
adequately address agricultural sources of water pollution is 
grounded in the failure to strategically target resources to the areas 
of greatest need; the reliance on the wrong performance measures; 
and the lack of robust monitoring, reporting, and enforcement.164  
The literature on successful voluntary environmental programs also 
suggests that voluntary environmental programs are most successful 
where there is a credible enforcement threat that can be 
implemented if voluntary programs fail.165  Minnesota’s past 
experience suggests that voluntary programs must meet certain 
base criteria to be successful. 
First, state voluntary programs must actively target those 
watersheds that are most challenged and those farms that offer the 
greatest opportunity to significantly improve water quality.  It is not 
enough to have BMPs on the ground; BMPs must be in locations 
that matter.  While participation is key to any voluntary program,166 
the nature of the participant greatly determines the outcome of the 
program.  States can no longer afford to take the first farmer that 
walks in the door regardless of his or her good intentions; state 
voluntary programs must target those farms where BMP 
implementation will have the greatest impact on water quality. 
Second, while testing and developing BMPs is essential, 
adoption of BMPs without more can no longer be the measure of 
success.167  The ultimate measure of success must be sustained and 
 
 162.  STATE OF THE MINNESOTA RIVER 2008, supra note 159, at 16–17. 
 163.  Marcotty, supra note 6. 
 164.  Cannon, supra note 72, at 628. 
 165.  Dowd et al., supra note 121, at 152. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  McElfish et al., supra note 4, at 160 (noting that while the eLINK system 
provides a good measure of participation, the system does not measure 
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measurable improvement in water quality.  Financial awards and 
incentives must be premised on improved water quality.  If 
improvement is not detected in a reasonable time, the states, the 
EPA, and the USDA must pull public investments and move on.  
Additionally, if the tax-paying public is to continue to subsidize 
these voluntary farm conservation programs, either through 
financial incentives or through releases from government 
regulation, then, as prudent managers of public resources, the 
states and the EPA must provide some certainty that the public’s 
investments will produce long-term results and report these results 
on an ongoing basis. 
Third, the states and the EPA must devote resources to 
improvements in monitoring, reporting, and enforcement.  They 
must go into the field and determine whether BMPs are actually 
performing the desired hydrologic functions.  More importantly, 
monitoring requires actual field measurements, not modeled 
estimates of the impacts of BMPs on water quality.  Surely if 
Minnesota’s experience with the Minnesota River has taught 
anything, it is that what was modeled (e.g., significant reductions in 
soil erosion and nutrients like phosphorus and nitrogen) was not 
what was actually happening in the watershed.  A significant first 
step in this direction would be to regularly test the outflow from 
drainage ditch systems and streams in the vicinity of participating 
farms. 
Fourth, there must be real consequences for the failure to 
participate in the voluntary program in the form of a robust 
regulatory program.  Such a regulatory program would serve both 
as an inducement to participate in voluntary programs and a 
deterrent to free riders.  Without the threat of a regulatory 
program, there is little new incentive for farmers to participate in a 
voluntary program.  In fact, the absence of a regulatory program 
arguably creates a disincentive to participate in voluntary programs 
to the extent that those farmers that do not participate in the 
program receive the benefit of the program’s liability release 
without bearing any of the burdens of implementing conservation 
practices or BMPs.  Can the Ag Certainty Program meet these 
minimal threshold requirements? 
 
environmental results directly).   
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IV. THE PROPOSED AG CERTAINTY PROGRAM  
The Ag Certainty Program is modeled on the sage grouse 
conservation voluntary certainty program adopted in the West, a 
program designed to preclude the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) from placing the sage grouse on the endangered species 
list.168  To understand how the parties intend the Ag Certainty 
Program to operate, it is first helpful to understand the parameters 
of the Sage Grouse Initiative. 
A. The Sage Grouse Initiative 
The sage grouse is a chicken-like, ground-dwelling bird whose 
primary habitat is the large swaths of contiguous sagebrush that 
historically dominated many parts of the American West.169  Sage 
grouse populations were once so numerous in the American West 
that they would “blacken the sky.”170  Their historic range extended 
across thirteen states and three Canadian provinces and totaled 
463,500 square miles.171  The national sage grouse population has 
substantially declined,172 and today sage grouse occupy fifty-six 
percent of their historic range.173 
It is widely believed that a significant factor contributing to the 
decline of sage grouse populations is habitat destruction and 
fragmentation attributed to development.174  Unfortunately for the 
sage grouse, large portions of its remaining habitat “coincide with 
prime areas for natural gas development, wind energy projects, 
grazing allotments, [and] transmission lines.”175  In 2002, the FWS 
received a petition to list the sage grouse.176  What ensued was a tale 
 
 168.  Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 15; Janet Kubat 
Willette, Ag Water Quality Advisory Council Holds First Meeting, AGRINEWS (Aug. 13, 
2012, 12:56 PM), http://www.agrinews.com/printStory.php?storyID=4731. 
 169.  12-Month Findings for Petitions to List the Greater Sage-Grouse 
(Centrocercus urophasianus) as Threatened or Endangered, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,910, 
13,912, 13,916 (proposed Mar. 23, 2010). 
 170.  Elizabeth A. Schulte, The Sage Grouse Rebellion, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 
59, 59 (2011).  In 1950, the estimated sage grouse population was between 1.6 and 
16 million.  75 Fed. Reg. at 13,920. 
 171.  75 Fed. Reg. at 13,917. 
 172.  Id. at 13.921.  Current population estimates range from 100,000 to 
500,000.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 13.917. 
 174.  Id. at 13.923. 
 175.  Schulte, supra note 170, at 60. 
 176.  75 Fed. Reg. at 13.910.  The sage grouse was designated as a potential 
candidate for listing in 1985.  Id. 
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of high drama that had all “the hallmarks of a Hollywood western, 
featuring conflict and intrigue among the tumbleweed, federal 
agents accused of tampering with information and intimidating 
personnel, and a ‘hanging judge’ striking down perceived outlaw 
behavior.”177  The drama was caused in part by the constraints of 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).  The ESA extends protections 
to listed endangered and threatened species,178 including the 
designation of critical habitat.179  The FWS has broad discretion to 
determine which species merit listing as threatened or endangered, 
but listing determinations must be made “on the basis of the best 
scientific and commercial data available.”180  Once a species is listed 
the FWS is required to designate critical habitat.181 
Listing affords listed species certain protections, including 
protection from “takes.”182  The taking of a species includes 
harming the species—any act that kills or injures wildlife; harm 
includes “significant habitat modification or degradation” that may 
impair a species’ essential behavioral patterns.183  Listing the sage 
grouse and the designation of its critical habitat would substantially 
constrain energy development and ranching activities on both 
private and federal lands,184 adversely impacting regional 
economies.185  The potential impacts of a sage grouse listing caused 
Interior Secretary Norton to characterize the sage grouse as the 
 
 177.  Schulte, supra note 170, at 59. 
 178.  The ESA requires federal agencies to limit actions that would “take” 
listed species and prohibits commercial or private “takings” of species or their 
habitat.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a), 1538(a) (2006).  For a detailed discussion of the 
legislative history of the ESA and the listing process, see generally Sherry A. Enzler 
& Jeremy T. Bruskotter, Contested Definitions of Endangered Species: The Controversy 
Regarding How to Interpret the Phrase “A Significant Portion of a Species’ Range” 27 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2009). 
 179.  § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
 180.  Id. § 1533 (b)(1)(A). 
 181.  Id. § 1533 (a)(3)(A)(i).  Critical habitat is “the specific areas within the 
geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . , on which are 
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the 
species and (II) which may require special management considerations or 
protection . . . .”  Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i). 
 182.  Id. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1)(B). 
 183.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2012).  See generally Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (affirming the FWS definition of 
“take” to include habitat destruction). 
 184.  Amanda R. Garcia, The Sage Grouse Debate: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the 
Discourse of the Endangered Species Act, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 572, 596–98 (2006) 
(discussing the economic impacts of listing the sage grouse).   
 185.  Robert Tee Spjute, Weathering the Storm: Finding Safe Harbors in ESA 
Controversy, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 331, 339 (2010). 
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“spotted owl of the Intermountain West”186 and launched a 
proposal to amend the ESA.187 
One management strategy put forward by the federal 
government to avoid a protracted and a potentially brutal listing 
fight was to promote the adoption of voluntary conservation 
agreements (VCA), encouraging landowners to voluntarily set aside 
and restore habitat in order to avoid species listings and the 
restraints imposed by critical habitat designation.188  Theoretically, 
the threat of listing together with the ESA’s regulatory restrictions 
on land use would serve as a hammer inducing participation in 
habitat conservation programs.189  Additionally, the potential ESA 
regulatory restrictions would act as a deterrent to removing lands 
from conservation status as commodity market and land prices 
increase.  In exchange for entering into VCAs, individual 
landowners would receive assurances that in the event of a sage 
grouse listing, VCA participants would be exempt from more 
extensive land use restrictions that might be imposed by critical 
habitat designation.190  VCA participants may or may not receive 
monetary payments to further induce participation.191  It was 
release from the regulatory constraints of the ESA that served as 
the primary inducement to participate in the VCA program.192  A 
secondary inducement is the fact that if the cumulative impact of 
VCAs increased species populations, the need to list would be 
negated. 
In 2010, the FWS and the Natural Resources Conservation 
Service (NRCS) entered into a collaborative agreement to 
undertake landscape-level habitat improvements across the sage 
grouse range through the Sage Grouse Initiative (SGI).193  The SGI 
 
 186.  Garcia, supra note 184, at 575. 
 187.  Id. at 574. 
 188.  Andrew G. Frank, Reforming the Endangered Species Act: Voluntary 
Conservation Agreements, Government Compensation and Incentives for Private Action, 22 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 144 (1997). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 146–47. 
 191.  Gregory A. Hicks, Protecting and Promoting Wildlife Habitat on State and 
Private Land in Washington’s Arid Interior, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 
16 (1997).  
 192.  Frank, supra note 188, at 146–47. 
 193.  See generally FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., CONFERENCE REPORT FOR THE 
NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE (SGI) 6, app. 1 
(2010), available at ftp://ftp-fc.sc.egov.usda.gov/ID/programs/sage-grouse/sg 
_conference_report_073010.pdf; NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., 
INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’ NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE: WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 
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strategically uses VCAs to preserve sage grouse habitat in sage 
grouse “core areas” with the ultimate goal of increasing sage grouse 
populations to meet a seventy-five percent abundance threshold.194  
Meeting this goal would preclude the need to list the species.195 
The NRCS took the lead in enlisting landowners using VCAs.  
By entering into VCAs, individual landowners were assured that 
they would be insulated from future ESA land use restrictions in 
the event the sage grouse was listed. 196  This protection was 
afforded because, by participating in the SGI, the landowner was 
already engaged in the habitat protection necessary to restore 
species populations.197  The SGI included regular scientific 
monitoring to assess the status of sage grouse populations and their 
response to habitat conservation practices, and to assure 
attainment of long-term sage grouse restoration goals.198  
Landowners that participated in the SGI were also eligible for 
federal WHIP and EQIP grant funding.199 
The SGI has several important features of effective voluntary 
programs.  First, the SGI has strategic natural resource targets.  
Efforts expended under the initiative are focused or targeted on 
core areas—areas of habitat important to sage grouse viability and 
geographic areas most likely to contribute to species viability.  
Second, the SGI has a specific resource-based goal—increased sage 
grouse populations to meet the seventy-five percent abundance 
threshold.200  The goal’s focus is increased viability of the sage 
grouse, not the number of acres under VCAs.  Third, actual field 
measurements and monitoring of sage grouse populations are used 
to determine the success or failure of the SGI.  Finally, the initiative 
is supported by a regulatory scheme with significant consequences 
 
THROUGH SUSTAINABLE RANCHING (2010) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’ 
NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE], available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE 
_DOCUMENTS/nrcsdev11_023946.pdf. 
 194.  See INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’ NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE, supra note 193, 
at 4. 
 195.  Id. at 6. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 7. 
 199.  Greater Sage-Grouse Working Lands for Wildlife Initiative, WYO. NAT’L 
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, http://www.wy.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/SGI 
/SGI_EQIP.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).  See supra note 148 for a description 
of WHIP and EQIP. 
 200.  INTRODUCTION TO NRCS’ NEW SAGE-GROUSE INITIATIVE, supra note 193, 
at 4. 
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for failure to participate and/or failure to comply with the VCAs’ 
habitat restoration terms.  If the VCA strategy fails, the sage grouse 
will be listed, critical habitat will be designated, and with that 
designation will come significant land use restrictions and 
regulations.  It is the ESA stick that provides inducement to 
participate in the program and the release of ESA regulatory 
constraints provided by the VCAs that are the incentive to the 
landowner to participate in the program.  This incentive, unlike 
monetary incentives, has the benefit of maintaining VCAs over time 
as land values increase.  This brief analysis of the SGI suggests that 
the SGI is more likely to meet natural resource goals and increase 
sage grouse viability because it embodies the key elements 
necessary for a successful, voluntary environmental program.  Sage 
grouse viability is not dependent upon random acts of 
conservation. 
B. Applying the Lessons of the SGI to the Ag Certainty Program 
It is unclear whether the Ag Certainty Program will 
incorporate the threshold elements necessary to ensure improved 
water quality.  The federal-state Ag Certainty MOU does not 
provide significant insight into how Minnesota’s Ag Certainty 
Program will operate.  The MOU indicates that Minnesota will 
develop and implement a certification program designed to 
encourage BMP adoption by agricultural producers while assuring 
agricultural producers that, by participating in the Ag Certainty 
Program, they are meeting federal and state water quality goals and 
standards.201  A Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) will be 
formed to develop and implement the certification to “support” 
state water quality standards and goals.202  The state and federal 
partners also agreed to prioritize state and federal funding to 
support the program’s development and implementation.203 
Further insight into how the federal partners intend the Ag 
Certainty Program to operate may be gleaned from the July 2011 
 
 201.  STATE OF MINN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
ENGAGING IN A STATE AND FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORT OF THE MINNESOTA 
AGRICULTURAL WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 2 (2012) [hereinafter 
MOU], available at http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection             
/~/media/Files/protecting/waterprotection/awqcmou.ashx. 
 202.  Id. at 2. 
 203.  Id.  
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EPA-USDA Certainty Framework (Certainty Framework).204  
According to the Certainty Framework, two of the primary goals of 
the Ag Certainty Program are: (1) increasing adoption of 
conservation practices and BMPs by agricultural producers and (2) 
providing assurances to the agricultural operations that 
“investments in conservation practices” will yield economic and 
environmental returns “consistent with state water quality 
programs.”205  Interestingly, conferring certainty on producers for 
BMP implementation does not relieve the state of its obligation to 
meet TMDL allocations—the state would simply be required to 
look to other pollution sources to meet allocation requirements.206 
What is particularly problematic is that the Certainty 
Framework does not include any of the essential elements of 
successful voluntary environmental programs.  Outside of the 
indirect reference to environmental returns, there is scant 
reference to improved water quality in either the goals or objectives 
outlined in the Certainty Framework.207  Unlike the SGI agreement 
between the FWS and the NRCS, which established both a clear 
recovery goal for the sage grouse and targeted federal investments 
to agricultural operations that are “core” sage grouse areas,208 there 
is no suggestion in the Certainty Framework that federal and state 
investments should target those water bodies posing either the 
greatest water quality challenge or the greatest opportunity for 
water quality improvement.  Nor is there any suggestion that the 
EPA abandon its voluntary-only approach if the Ag Certainty 
Program fails.  Thus, there is no meaningful federal regulatory 
threat to induce long-term participation, a factor that was 
particularly important to the success of the SGI.  If, then, the Ag 
Certainty Program is to incorporate those elements essential to 
successful voluntary programs, it will be left to the State of 
Minnesota and TAC to include them in the Ag Certainty Program 
 
 204.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CERTAINTY FRAMEWORK 
1 (2011) [hereinafter CERTAINTY FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.mn.nrcs 
.usda.gov/partnerships/mstc/2011_Oct25/Certainty%20Framework%20FINAL 
%20july%2019%202011.pdf. 
 205.  Id. at 1. 
 206.  Id.  Looking to regulated pollution sources for further pollution 
reductions is inequitable.  Hypothetically, if there is no improvement in water 
quality, the state would look to other sources, including point sources, to reduce 
pollution loads, even though said sources have significantly reduced their 
pollution loads under the terms of their WLAs and NPDES permits. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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design. 
Early indications that the state will take on this task are not 
particularly hopeful.  In the spring of 2011, MnDAg announced the 
membership of the TAC.  Of the fifteen members, only three 
represent environmental interests, while agricultural business 
interests, including the Minnesota Farm Bureau, the major 
commodity groups, and individual farmers, hold nine seats.209  The 
very membership of TAC suggests to some that the integrity of 
Minnesota’s waters over the next five to ten years will be left in the 
hands of agricultural business interests.210 
The TAC Charge does leave room to incorporate some of the 
elements of successful voluntary environmental programs.211  The 
TAC Charge directs TAC to develop a “voluntary” program that 
enhances adoption of BMPs to improve water quality while 
providing participating agricultural producers the regulatory 
certainty that “our water resources and farmers both deserve.”212  
This directive is sufficiently vague so as to permit TAC to 
recommend both water quality targeting and goals.  However, the 
primary thrust of the TAC Charge appears to be to encourage 
program enrollment with little attention given to water quality 
outcomes.  The five specific questions and the numerous sub-
questions included in the TAC Charge are directed toward 
participant identification, the scope of certification, the certainty 
provided to agricultural producers, technical assistance, 
identification of additional incentives to further induce 
participation, and program management.213  Only one of the sub-
questions remotely addresses water quality targeting—“Should the 
certification program be a whole farm approach or [target] specific 
segments related to water quality?”214  A plain reading of the TAC 
 
 209.  Minnesota Agricultural Water Quality Certification Program: Advisory 
Committee, MINN. DEPARTMENT AGRIC., http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting 
/waterprotection/awqcprogram/committeemembers.aspx (last visited Jan. 8, 
2013). 
 210.  Don Shelby, Cities, Industries Have Reduced Their Mississippi River 
Pollution—Now It’s Farmers’ Turn, MINNPOST (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.minnpost 
.com/environment/2012/01/cities-industries-have-reduced-their-mississippi-river  
-pollution-%E2%80%94-now-its-farme. 
 211.  MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CHARGE TO THE MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL WATER 
QUALITY CERTIFICATION PROGRAM TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2012) 
[hereinafter TAC CHARGE]. 
 212.  Id. at 1. 
 213.  Id. at 1–2. 
 214.  Id. at 1. 
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Charge indicates the only real discernible distinction between the 
Ag Certainty Program and other voluntary agricultural water 
quality programs is the addition of “certainty” or the release from 
potential future liability.  In comparing the parameters of the Ag 
Certainty Program TAC Charge with the SGI parameters, it is clear 
that the only significant parallel between the two programs is the 
“regulatory certainty” that both programs are intended to provide. 
In June 2012, before the first meeting of TAC, the NRCS 
Minnesota State Technical Committee Subcommittee on Certainty 
(MSTC Subcommittee) submitted a set of “recommendations” to 
the Minnesota Agriculture Commissioner outlining how 
Minnesota’s Ag Certainty Program should operate.215  These 
recommendations were presented to TAC for consideration at its 
July 30, 2012, meeting.216  The MSTC Subcommittee 
recommendations do not embrace the core elements of successful 
voluntary environmental programs; rather, they support adopting 
the elements of failed voluntary, incentive-based water quality 
programs. 
First, although the MSTC Subcommittee recommends 
targeting the Ag Certainty Program, the targets are not resource 
based.  It recommends the Ag Certainty Program target a handful 
of watersheds where there is a diversity of land use and where 
agricultural producers have willingly participated in voluntary, 
incentive-based water quality programs in the past,217 a 
 
 215.  The July 30, 2012, TAC minutes characterize the MSTC Subcommittee 
submittal as recommendations, although the MSTC Subcommittee characterizes 
the submittal as a response to questions posed to the MSTC by the Minnesota 
Commissioner of Agriculture.  Minn. Agric. Water Quality Certification                
Program Advisory Comm., July 30, 2012 Minutes, MINN. DEPARTMENT AGRIC.                                               
(July 30, 2012), http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection 
/awqcprogram/minutesandagendas/july302012minutes.aspx [hereinafter July 30, 
2012 Minutes]; Letter from Don Baloun, State Conservationist, NRCS, & Warren 
Formo, Exec. Dir., Minn. Agric. Water Res. Ctr., to David Frederickson, Comm’r, 
Minn. Dep’t of Agric. (June 27, 2012) (on file with author).  Interestingly, the 
Minnesota Agricultural Water Resources Center is a membership organization 
whose membership is exclusively composed of the major agricultural commodity 
organizations and the Minnesota Farm Bureau.  MAWRC Member Organizations, 
MINN. AGRIC. WATER RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.mawrc.org/mawrc                            
-members.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
 216.  July 30, 2012 Minutes, supra note 215. 
 217.  Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, Comm’r 
of Agric. (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.mn.nrcs.usda.gov/partnerships 
/mstc/2012_July12/Final%20NRCS%20subcommittee%20report%20w%20cover
%20letter.pdf. 
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recommendation adopted in part by the TAC.218  This 
recommendation perpetuates one of the significant flaws of past 
voluntary agricultural incentive-based programs—the failure to 
target programs to those areas most likely to result in the greatest 
water quality improvement or those watersheds with the greatest 
impairments.  This recommendation deviates from the SGI, on 
which the Ag Certainty Program is purportedly modeled.  The 
SGI’s strategic targets are resource based—those core sage grouse 
areas likely to increase the viability of the species.  The target was 
linked to a concrete resource goal—increased viability of the sage 
grouse.  It was the sage grouse that drove participant selection; the 
willingness of agricultural producers to participate in the program 
was a secondary factor.  If the Ag Certainty Program is to succeed in 
improving our water quality, TAC must target watersheds with the 
greatest impairment or watersheds where the implementation of 
BMPs have the greatest likelihood of significantly improving 
ambient water quality in the receiving body. 
Second, the MSTC Subcommittee recommendations make 
little reference to actual improvements of water quality.  Its 
recommended program goal appears to be to assure the public that 
certified farms are managed responsibly to improve water quality 
while improving the public’s understanding of agricultural 
production systems and the scope of BMP implementation.219  And 
while the MSTC Subcommittee lists improved water quality as an 
outcome, it does not recommend establishing quantifiable water 
quality goals for the Ag Certainty Program.220  Rather, it suggests 
adopting a “trust us” standard—trust that if we enter into these 
agreements and implement conservation measures and BMPs, the 
water will improve.  This strategy was also largely adopted by TAC, 
whose recommendations focus on BMP implementation rather 
than water quality improvement goals, assuming that BMP 
implementation will result in improved water quality.221  This 
 
 218.  The TAC recommendation is limited to a handful of watersheds in the 
state’s three agricultural subregions, representing a diversity of agricultural 
production.  Memorandum from the Minn. Agric. Water Quality Certification 
Program Advisory Comm. to David J. Frederickson, Comm’r of Agric. 2 (Nov. 14, 
2012), available at http://www.mda.state.mn.us/protecting/waterprotection                 
/~/media/Files/protecting/waterprotection/mawqcpadcomrecs2012.ashx. 
 219.  Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, supra 
note 217. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See generally Memorandum from the Minn. Agric. Water Quality 
Certification Program Advisory Comm. to David J. Frederickson, supra note 218. 
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approach stands in sharp contrast to the SGI, which set a concrete 
and quantifiable resource goal for the SGI—an increase in sage 
grouse populations. 
If the Ag Certainty Program is to improve Minnesota’s water 
quality, then TAC must set actual, quantifiable water quality goals 
for both the participating watersheds (interim water quality 
standards) and the participants in the program (quantifiable load 
reductions).  This could be done by setting interim ambient water 
quality goals for the selected watershed and at the same time 
establishing quantifiable load reduction goals for program 
participants.  The latter could be monitored by testing discharge 
from the drainage ditch systems of participating agricultural 
producers. 
This strategy has been particularly successful in the Everglades, 
where the Everglades Forever Act (EFA) and a consent decree 
require agricultural producers to meet a quantitative phosphorus 
reduction schedule designed to meet an interim ambient 
phosphorus water quality standard of fifty ppb and a long-term 
ambient phosphorus water quality standard of ten ppb.222  As a 
result of this strategy, by 2005, phosphorus levels in the Everglades 
had dropped to fifty ppb.223 
Third, although the MSTC Subcommittee recommends that 
the state use independent, third-party certifiers to approve 
participants’ conservation plans and verify plan implementation 
and BMP placement, it does not recommend testing or 
monitoring.224  While review of conservation plans and verification 
of plan implementation is an important aspect of this program, the 
Minnesota River experience demonstrates that verification of BMP 
 
 222.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.4592 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); 
United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 88-1886-CIV-HOEVELER (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 27, 2001) (omnibus order approving 1995 request to modify                     
settlement agreement to reflect the provisions of the EFA),                                                  
available at http://www.evergladeshub.com/lit/LEGAL/Hoeveler01-USA-Micco           
-8-1886civHoeveler-Decree-010427.pdf.  The sugar industry agreed to meet rolling 
phosphorus reduction goals for discharges coming off sugar fields to assure 
progress toward the ambient water quality goals of fifty ppb and ten ppb.  U.S. 
SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1993), available at 
http://www.law.miami.edu/library/everglades/ (follow “Documents” hyperlink; 
then follow “Statement of Principles” hyperlink). 
 223.  NAT’L PARK SERV. & S. FLA. NATURAL RES. CTR., JOINT REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: EVERGLADES WATER QUALITY 16 (2005), available at http:// 
digitalcollections.fiu.edu/sfrc/pdfs/FI11060808.pdf. 
 224.  Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, supra 
note 217.   
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placement and estimates of pollution load reductions using eLink 
are not sufficient to ensure that the program is actually yielding 
results in the form of cleaner water.  TAC has proposed using a 
modified Water Quality Index and Conservation Measurement 
Tool, but it is unclear whether either of these tools will require 
actual detailed water monitoring—as opposed to the SGI, which 
actually monitored bird populations throughout the course of 
program implementation.225 
Finally, it is clear that one of the most important elements of 
successful voluntary environmental programs is the threat of 
regulatory controls.  In the case of the SGI, it was the threat of a 
sage grouse ESA listing coupled with the associated land use 
restrictions that motivated participation by agricultural producers.  
There is no existing regulatory leverage in Minnesota.  The MPCA 
has consistently relied upon voluntary programs to address 
agricultural nonpoint pollution.  Neither the TAC Charge226 nor 
the MSTC Subcommittee recommendations227 suggest that 
agricultural producers that choose not to participate in the 
program should or will face actual regulatory controls. 
Although Governor Dayton apparently understands that a 
regulatory threat might be necessary to ensure program success, 
there is no history to suggest that Minnesota is willing to take the 
regulatory step.  Absent some concrete indication to agricultural 
operators that Minnesota intends to regulate agricultural nonpoint 
pollution, Dayton’s threat that those agricultural producers that do 
not participate in the Ag Certainty Program may be forced to do so 
by law228 is little more than a hollow threat.  This is not to say that, 
with a little creativity, Minnesota could not legally require 
agricultural operators to abate water pollution. 
For example, Minnesota Statutes section 115.061 imposes a 
duty to report and abate the discharge229 “of any substance or 
 
 225.  Memorandum from the Minn. Agric. Water Quality Certification 
Program Advisory Comm. to David J. Frederickson, supra note 218, at 5.  Nor do 
the final TAC recommendations include a requirement to measure water quality, 
relying instead on a modification of the Conservation Measurement Tool and 
Water Quality Index, both modeling formulas designed to assess the anticipated 
water benefits of BMPs.  Id. 
 226.  See generally TAC CHARGE supra note 211. 
 227.  See generally Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. 
Frederickson, supra note 217. 
 228.  Shelby, supra note 210. 
 229.  A discharge is “the addition of any pollutant to the waters of the 
state . . . .”  MINN. STAT. § 115.01, subdiv. 4 (2010). 
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material” that may cause water pollution.230  Violators may be 
required to pay remediation and restoration costs and may be 
subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000 a day.231  Although section 
115.071 contains an agricultural exemption, the exemption is 
limited “to air and land pollution caused by” non-permitted 
agricultural operations.232  Land pollution involves the disposal of 
waste on land,233 including “solid waste, sewage sludge, . . . 
hazardous waste,”234 garbage, refuse, and sludge from agricultural 
operations.235  Sediment discharged from agricultural operations 
into Minnesota’s rivers, lakes, and streams is essentially loose sand, 
clay, silt, and soil236 carried by runoff.  It is not land pollution.  As 
such, sediment discharge falls outside the land pollution 
exemption—it is a discharge of a substance or material causing 
water pollution within the purview of section 115.061(a) and 
subject to regulation.  The threat of a civil penalty for discharging 
sediments into the waters of the state in violation of Minnesota 
Statutes section 115.071 could constitute a sufficient regulatory 
threat to induce long-term participation in the Ag Certainty 
Program, should the state choose to use the threat. 
In short, for the Ag Certainty Program to be successful, 
Minnesota must actually be prepared to impose regulatory 
restraints on those agricultural operations that do not choose to 
participate in the Ag Certainty Program.  Absent such a threat, it is 
 
 230.  Id. § 115.061(a) (emphasis added). 
 231.  Id. § 115.071, subdiv. 3. 
 232.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 233.  Land pollution is “the presence in or on the land of any waste in such 
quantity, of such nature and duration, and under such condition as would affect 
injuriously any waters of the state.”  Id. § 116.06, subdiv. 14. 
 234.  Id. § 115A.03, subdiv. 34.  Hazardous waste is 
any refuse, sludge, or other water material or combination of refuse, 
sludge or other waste materials in solid, semisolid, liquid, or contained 
gaseous form which because of its quantity, concentration, or chemical, 
physical, or infectious characteristics may (a) cause or significantly 
contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness; or (b) pose a substantial 
present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when 
improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise 
managed. 
Id. §116.06, subdiv. 11. 
 235.  Id. § 116.06, subdiv. 22. 
 236.  See MID-AM. REG’L COUNCIL, WHAT IS SEDIMENT POLLUTION? (n.d.), 
available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npstbx/files/KSMO_Sediment.pdf; Sediments, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/sediments/ (last 
updated Jan. 31, 2012). 
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unclear that the release provided by the Ag Certainty Agreements 
will be a sufficient inducement to encourage meaningful 
participation in the program.  And those agricultural producers 
that choose not to participate in the Ag Certainty Program will 
indirectly reap the benefit created by participating producers.  
Because if the state is unwilling to regulate for the five or ten years 
it takes to test this program, the non-participants will get a five-to-
ten year pollution entitlement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In passing the Legacy Amendment, the citizens of Minnesota 
evidenced both a commitment to clean water and a willingness to 
expend public resources to ensure a clean water legacy for future 
generations of Minnesotans.  One of Minnesota’s greatest clean 
water challenges is agricultural nonpoint pollution.  A meaningful 
method of controlling agricultural pollution is essential to ensure 
Minnesota’s clean-water legacy.  To date, Minnesota has relied on 
voluntary, incentive-based programs to meet the challenges posed 
by agricultural water pollution.  But voluntary, incentive-based 
programs have been unsuccessful.  An analysis of these failed 
programs, together with an analysis of the SGI, suggests that 
voluntary environmental programs can be successful if the 
incentives are targeted to improve water quality, the program 
includes quantifiable resource/water quality goals, both participant 
performance and the resource are monitored throughout the life 
of the program, and the program is backed by the threat of real 
regulatory controls. 
The Minnesota Ag Certainty Program proposes a new 
approach to address agricultural water pollution.  It uses the 
release from future regulation and financial incentives to 
encourage agricultural producers to participate in conservation 
practices.  However, simply adding the inducement of regulatory 
certainty without more will not result in improved water quality.  
To ensure performance, the architects of the Minnesota Ag 
Certainty Program must target challenged watershed and 
agricultural operations presenting the greatest opportunity to 
improve water quality.  They must set numeric water quality goals 
and continuously measure water quality to assure program 
performance.  Finally, Minnesota must support the program with a 
meaningful threat to regulate agricultural water pollution.  Without 
these parameters, Minnesotans have no more than a vague 
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assurance that the Minnesota Ag Certainty Program will result in 
improved water quality.  Certainly the citizens of Minnesota, in 
passing the Legacy Amendment, expected that their investment in 
Minnesota’s waters would result in more than a vague assurance 
that farmers are managing their farms responsibly to improve water 
quality.237 
 
 
 237.  See Memorandum from MSTC Subcomm. to David J. Frederickson, supra 
note 217 (addressing questions about what assurances the program provides to the 
public). 
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